Why are Some American Presidents More Successful than Others?

 Why are Some American Presidents More Successful than Others?

 

Introduction

            Presidential success remains to date one of the most controversial and elusive topics in political science. This is because there is no consensus amongst scholars of political science about how to define a successful presidency and what entails a successful presidency (Gao & Smith 2016). These issues make the topic of presidential success pen to debate and thus an interesting subject. Despite the difficulty in defining a successful presidency, such presidents as Washington, Jefferson, Roosevelt, and Lincoln have time and again been ranked as the most successful, while the likes of Pierce, Hoover, and Buchanan have been consistently ranked lowly in terms of the success of their presidency (Jones 2005). This then such raking the idea that some presents can be deemed to have been successful time and again, even as others are consistently identified as having had achieved little in their presidency arouses our interest in why some presidents would succeed where others may have failed (Pika &Maltese 2013). The premise of this essay is to establish whether the success or failure of a president is determined by political skills and character alone, or whether political circumstances also play a role in it.

            So far, various theories of the presidency have been developed with the goal of explaining and forecasting presidential success or failure. In particular, four scholars of political science offer such approaches to the 20th and 21st-century presidents (Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha 2007). They are: Skowronek, Barber, Tulis and Nuestadt. While these theories have done little in the way of allowing political scientists to reach a consensus on a generally accepted method of ranking presidents, or even forecast which presidential candidate is more likely to succeed once in office, we can however identify from them approaches to forecast presidential failure or success. 

            The President's character has attracted the attention of various scholars under varied historical settings as a key determinant of the success of a successful presidency. Greenstein (1982) opines that certain Presidents possessed certain personal attributes which were instrumental in their failure as Presidents, or success. For instance, according to Greenstein, George Washington “radiated authority”. Consequently, George Washington was able to command enhanced cooperation and respect from congress. Conversely, Greenstein describes John Adams as “self-righteous, irritable, and contentious” (2009, p. 25). Since people generally loathe this personal characterises, this could perhaps explain why Adams, according to Greenstein, was a presidential failure.

            Barber was yet another scholar who was interested in establishing the significance of presidential character as a determining factor of their success in office. He identified character, style, and world-view as the key character traits and endeavoured to develop a matrix that categorised presidents as passive or active in terms of their job performance and negative or positive based on their level of satisfaction or enjoyment that one derived by virtue of being president (Nowlan 2016). To Greenstein however, the presidential character is by far the most potent predictor of success in the presidency. Accordingly, Presidents who have strong character ultimately develop their individual paths to success (Pedro & Valkanov 2003). This is because they are better able to communicate with the public (Rottinghaus 2006), not to mention that they are highly capable of can develop and garnering popular support from citizens for the policies that they believe in.

            A president with a clear vision of the policy that he is advocating for is perfectly aware of what he wishes to accomplish from the word go and as such, can envision possible obstacles along the way. Moreover having high emotional intelligence enables a president to easily navigate the social environment and more importantly, overcome potentially damaging and/or scandalous behaviour. However, Skowronek (1993) is of the view that recurring structures of political power and political time are far more superior determinants of an unsuccessful or successful presidency in comparison with the president's personal attributes. Skowronek s model is rather complex, as it considers the dominant regimes in American politics, including the Jeffersonian Democracy and the New Deal Liberalism era. A president political situation, according to Skowronek, depends on their association with the dominant political regimes, and the resilient nature of how committed the regime is to its policies. For this reason, no two presidents could have similar situations (Steger 2005). The recurrent structure of political authority and political time blends in well with the noticeable.

The situation of transformation namely, the cyclical change of power from one regime to another has been witnessed time and again in American history (Ellis & Nelson 2014). Crucially, Skowronek's model offers an explanation of how some Presidents, while being highlighted as intelligent and talented do not succeed in the White House.  In 'The Politics Presidents Make', Skowronek (1997) provides a rather complex theory of the presidency. He provides a typology that is useful in explaining presidential success or failure.  Skowronek's model provides that politics of reconstruction happen in the event that the President objects to an established regime, which is in turn susceptible to change. For instance, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Jackson, and Franklin Roosevelt “ “all came to power in this kind of situation…it is evident that these men shared the most promising of all situations for the exercise of political leadership” (Skowronek 1993, p. 37).   Our reconstructive Presidents have been, without any shadow of a doubt, great men; however, they ended up making radical changes not because they had forceful personalities, but because they came into power at a time when the United States was ready for change. Roosevelt and Lincoln had to make necessary changes in a bid to deal with the revolutionary change.

Skowrenek identifies the politics of reconstruction as a better indicator of the success of a president in comparison with the other recurrent structures.

However, the other structures also forecast presidential failure or success. According to Skowronek (1993), politics of disjunction occurs in the event that the President is linked to the established regime which is also susceptible to change.  Susceptibility is evident in case the current public policy fails to deal with the prevailing issues. In such a case, the President has to change the platform of the political party in addition to developing reforms. However, doing so is likely to jeopardise his affiliation with the party which was instrumental in the establishment of the current regime (Neustadt 1991). Examples of disjunctive presidents include Franklin Pierce, Jimmy Carter, John Adams, Herbert Hoover, and John Quincy Adams (Skowronek 1993). Besides being failures, disjunctive presidents are also “often singled out as political incompetents” (Skowronek 1993, p. 39). Disjunctive presidents rarely make great presidents since their political fate is such that they are regarded as being “inadequate” in paving way for reconstructive presidents. Moreover, an inadequacy of disjunctive presidents is viewed as resulting in the inadequacy of reconstructive presidents. Disjunctive presidents assume office when the commitments and ideology of the dominant regime are waning. Jimmy Carter's tenure in office is perhaps the best example of what a disjunctive prescient looks like. When Carter was elected to the presidency in 1976, the New Deal Liberalism, which Franklin D. Roosevelt helped to establish in 1932, was viewed as being obsolete. In addition, Carter came into office at a time when the United States was under a period of serious economic conditions, with the situation made worse by the oil crisis (Pedro & Valkanov 2003). The United States was also faced with a rather unstable political atmosphere. Republicans were rapidly gaily ground in the South, which was initially a political hotbed for the Democrats. While Carter quickly identified the issues facing his party and so he developed a plan to breathe life into the new deal liberalism. In the final analysis, however, his efforts proved futile.

            On the other hand, articulating presidents are characterised by a resilient regime with which the President is identified. In politics of articulation, the President will usually triumphantly execute incremental changes in the midst of an adherent congress.  A very good example of an articulating President is Harry Truman as he managed to “shake things up” while also eradicating policy hindrances (Skowronek 1993). Others include James Polk and Lyndon Johnson. Their politics sought to reorder and rearticulate the current regime.  The reason why we are likely to remember these presidents is because they faced “political self-sacrifice” while in office.

            Politics of pre-emption occurs in the event that a President is against a current regime even though the regime still has resilient commitments. Such presidents are compelled to adapt to the expectations of the resilient regime and at the same time endeavour to maintain their individual political identities. Examples of pre-emptive presidents include Woodrow Wilson, Bill Clinton, and Dwight Eisenhower. Pre-emptive Presidents find themselves faced with a tightrope-like scenario, in which they must be careful not to distance themselves from their voters, their party, or the current regime (Skowronek 1993). Various factors combine to derail efforts by pre-emptive presidents to turn into full-blown insurgents just like their reconstructive counterparts. To begin with, they are faced with a resilient and valid opposing regime, which was reasonable for developing the political framework upon which their political policies rest. In addition, pre-emptive presidents are characterised by very personalised commitments that are carefully moulded to avoid creating distance with distance with groups characterised by divergent political interests, thereby complicating the situation (Skowronek 1997). Also, pre-emptive presidents tend to be moderated and as such, avoid getting drawn too much by the way of doing things by the established regime this could they could lose their credibility with their party or voters.

            Great presidents are those who are able to in spite of their character alter their policies to fit in with the political climate and time, and with the prevailing structure of the political power. A good example here is Dwight Eisenhower. He was not focused on abandoning existing policies as he was operating as he was limited by pre-emptive politics (Dickerson 2011). Although he was opposed to the New Deal Liberalism, the policy commitments of the regime were quite resilient. Accordingly, Eisenhower decided to make small incremental changes as opposed to sweeping changes. As such, the climate of expectations and power situation facing presidents go a long way in determining the success of a president. According to Barber, “Presidential character resonates with the political situation that the president faces... expectation at any given time are the political air the President has to breathe (Primrose 2010, p. 2).

Other scholars of political science such as Lance Blakesly recognise that contextual circumstances play a key role in determining the success of a President. Blakesley (1995) was of the view that unfavourable contextual conditions might lead to the failure of a highly skilled president while favourable conditions could catapult an otherwise president who manifests in comparatively inept behaviour to success (Mawhey 2005). Examples of contextual problems that could break or make a presidency include White House scandals and international crises. International crises that might be beyond the scope of a sitting president or crises that the president might have inherited from the previous regime could either result in an overwhelmingly devastatingly negative impact on the legacy of a president, or an overwhelmingly positive effect (Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007). War has also been shown to result in a dichotomous impact of this nature, based on how the president handles it, and its final outcome (Blinder & Watson 2016). For example, World War II had a positive effect on Franklin D Roosevelt's legacy as it helped the United States to recover from the effects of the Great Depression (Burke 2016). Consequently, the country reasserted itself as a superpower once more (Byrne & Dominguez 2005), and this was a clear indication of Roosevelt's great leadership. 

            On the other hand, the Vietnam War had a tarnishing effect on Lyndon B. Johnson’s image, not to mention that it stifled his domestic agenda, although the previous regime of the Kennedy administration was responsible for the escalating situation in Vietnam. Clearly, these two events were beyond the control of the individual presidents (Rudalevige 2002), and we cannot say we are certain that Roosevelt could have won where Johnson failed, and vice versa.

            It is also important to appreciate the fact that in the 21st century, presidents are under a lot of scrutiny which was the case in previous eras (Gao & Smith 2016). The ubiquitous nature of media and technology means that modern presidents have to be very careful about their private and private actions before they come into the office (Edwards III & Howell 2011), during their tenure in office, and upon the expiry of their presidential term in office. Successful presidents such as Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy had extramarital affairs during their tenure as presidents. Both these affairs are not known to most people compared to say, the affairs of Bill Clinton. Although Kennedy’s transgressions left him barely unscathed, Bill Clinton thanks to the unique nature of the modern media was almost impeached as a result of his extramarital affairs (Seelke 2014).

President George W. Bush's first term in office can be could be classified as politics of articulation in that he demonstrated his leadership skills post 9/11, and the momentum saw him win another second term in office in which his popularity rating plummeted to an all-time low. This second term in office can either be categorised as politics of disjunction or a failed articulation attempt (Crockett 2003), based on how resilient the policy commitments of the conservative regime are. While the difference between the two is rather superficial in terms of its impact on the president’s legacy, on the other hand, it could have considerable effects in terms of the political implications of the next president. 

If we assume that Present George W. Bush's presidency's first term in office was a failed articulation, the implication made is that the regime is still sustainable. It would mean that the conservative regime that Reagan started was very much alive, and hence President Obama would be regarded as a pre-emptive president (Gibbs 2009). A second scenario would be to view President George W. Bush's second term in office as politics of disjunction, implying that the policy commitment that the regime’s policy commitment had become obsolete (Seelke 2014). This would then render President Obama's first term in office a politics of reconstruction. Accordingly, he would have a chance to start a new liberal regime and hence leave a legacy.  President Obama's shares a similar political situation to Franklin Roosevelt, in that both presidents were preceded by presidents who came under harsh criticism for their having not done enough to salvage the country's woes. This means that their successors had to inherit troubled economies. 

            In sum, there are many factors that determine the success of the president, and his character is just one of them. A president with better oratory and organisational skills will perform better than one who lacks these qualities. However political circumstances also play a crucial role in determining the success of a president while in office. Since political circumstances differ from one president to another, it becomes increasingly harder to make a valid comparison of presidents and hence establish a valid relationship between their success in office and character. However, Skowronek's theory affords an ideal predictor of the success of presidents in the White House. In this case, the political atmosphere/time has been heralded by several political scholars as a key indicator of the performance of a president. Contextual circumstances such as wars and White House scandals have also been proven to influence the success or failure of presidents while in office. 

 

 

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