Russia is neither a partner nor an enemy, but it is a problem-Discussion

‘Russia is neither a partner nor an enemy, but it is a problem.’

 

 

            Russia is a key player in global geopolitics. Russia, along with the United States, France, China, and the United Kingdom remains one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council[1]. The country is also a key member of the G-8 and G-20. Moreover, the country is a top global net exporter and producer of natural gas and crude oil[2]. Russia is quickly re-asserting itself as an active and capable military power, considering that its stockpile of nuclear weapons is the largest in the world.

            In order to gain insights into Russia's conflict with the West, it is important first to the background the Russian mindset. Russia has enjoyed a long and protracted history of servitude in which peasants were categorised into social units. The aristocracy and state-owned and managed these social units. This philosophy of collectivism would dominate the pre-Soviet and Soviet Union eras, which were characterised by considerable influence in the international arena[3]. The Russian people boasted of expansive industrial progress and foreign policy which the Russian people took pride in. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by Russia’s plummeting international influence, this has triggered a state of nostalgia among the Russian people about the good old times.  The collectivism philosophy was also replaced by an individualistic system of decision-making in the 1990s. Russia's actions, such as the annexation of Crimea is to a certain extent an indication of a yearning for the renaissance period in which the Soviet Union enjoyed national pride and stability.

            Whereas the Soviet Union and the West were entangled in a clash between communism versus capitalism ideologies, the ideological confrontation that pits Russia against the West has more to do with divergent beliefs and values[4]. In addition, Russia also differs from the West on matters to do with military compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, interpretation and execution of rules-based order, and protection of civilians. Pre-Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union enjoyed considerable influence in international relations.

            These differences reflect the Russian mindset in which Kremlin feels that the West has subjected the country to ill-treatment after the collapse of the Soviet Union[5]. Such a mindset may have led Russia to believe that while it may have lost the war in the political arena, it needs to fight for its interests by all means possible, and this includes strengthening its military.

            In recent years, Russia has invested heavily in its military operations, including undertaking modernisation programs. Based on its perceived mindset of being ill-treated by the West, Russia tries to justify its rapid militarisation and increased military spending by citing self-defence against NATO operatives. However, this may be interpreted as the country's attempt to mobilise internal dissent and external threats[6]. Recent statements and actions issued by senior government officials in Russia suggest that the country is reinforcing itself for a likely conflict with the West in the future. 

            Russian military actions in the Baltic States, the Arctic, Eastern Ukraine, and Crime region underscores a desire by Russia to reassert itself as a global power; ensuring the success of the country in the event of conflict with the West; to uphold Russia's economic and political influence in the region and globally; and to deter, weaken, and challenge Western resolve and cohesion[7]. Russia has largely had negative relations with the West. While there have been brief upturns, Russia-West relations have, for the most part, remained quite negative. This is mainly evident in the form of stark policy differences, divergent world-views, as well as a plummeting common interest. All of these differences have limited the desire for cooperation. Today, Russia and the West rarely agree on any issue, even in areas where it would be expected that there would be a meeting of minds, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and counter-terrorism activities.

            The Russian-UK relationship has been one of the sourest in comparison with relations between the country and other key West European nations. Tension began when the UK aligned itself with the US in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The relationships became frosty following the 2006 assassination of Alexander Litvinenko. Other developments that have led to the harsh and steady decline of the relationship include the 2008 ordering of the British Council by the Kremlin to shut down its offices, a directive that the British Council did not heed (Stent 2015). The Russian-Georgian war would then follow in which the UK was critical of Russia's invasion of Georgia. Although there have been attempts to restore harmony between the two nations, starting with a UK delegation to Moscow, headed by David Miliband (Kendal 2009), this did little to deal with the underlying issues.

            According to de Quincey (2013) Russia and the UK have endured years of political and ideological discontent regarding varied national interests.  However, the underlying issues have largely been mired by the emergence of various secondary issues that have placed the two countries on a collision course. For example, when the UK demanded that Russia's cooperate in its investigation of Litvinenko's murder, Moscow countered by demanding that the UK fast-track the extradition of Akhmed Zakayev and Boris Berezovksy. In addition, while the UK has been a harsh critic of Moscow's human rights abuses, on the other hand, the UK has declined to allow surviving veterans of World War Two assigned to the Arctic route to accept the Medal of Ushakov given by Russia (Sherr 2013). Not even high-profile encounters between government officials from the two countries in recent years have helped to alleviate the rift. For example in September 2011, David Cameron led a high-profile UK delegation to Moscow while in 2012 Vladimir Putin attended the Olympic Games in London.

These events, including the March 2013 2 + 2 'strategic dialogue' are indicative of attempts by either side to counterbalance their immobile foreign relations and ideological differences with prospects of enhanced investment and trade between the two nations.  Although the UK has enjoyed increased trade with Russia over more than a decade, it is also important that during the same period, the UK fell off the list of leading ten trading partners with Russia. The UK accounts for a partly 3 percent of Russian trade[8]. While the 2+2 strategic dialogue was a sensible move to salvage foreign relations between the UK and Russia, the initial session could not surmount the uneven past between these two nations.

Moreover, when the talks shifted focus to more strategic matters like the nuclear program in Iran and the Syria war, the exchange helped to highlight the complex nature of the underlying issues. However, the UK becomes important to Moscow in matter-energy. For example, the 2013 oil mega-deal between Rosneft and BP, along with Gazprom's desire to include Britain in the Nord Stream network is indicative of considerable pieces in Moscow's gas and oil strategy[9]. Nevertheless, on political matters of the pipelines and the EU'S third energy package, the EU Commission and Germany are at the centre of the action. In the same way, on matter of the nuclear program in Iran and the Syria war, Moscow views Britain, alongside the EU as the enemy (Harding 2013).  Russia's stockpiling of its nuclear arsenal is also a key aspect of its implied military philosophy.

In the same way, if we turn our attention to the situation in Syria, Moscow views the UK as part of the other troublemakers in the EU (European Union). Britain, alongside France, gets on the wrong side of Russia due to its role in arming the Syrian opposition and for its intervention in the situation in Libya. In addition, Britain supported the United States in its endeavour to push for tougher sanctions against Iran due to her nuclear weapons program, and this too did not go down well with Russia because she is a key ally of Iran[10]. These issues suggest that most decisions that the UK has made are contrary to the position taken by Russia, and this is a further testament to the ideological differences between the two countries[11]. Russia has defied pressure from the West to stop supporting the Assad regime, and this, therefore, makes Syria a key source of frustration for the UK government over the foreign polices that Moscow upholds. While there might be friction in the bilateral relations between Russia and the UK, the underlying cause of this friction happens to be the dimension taken by NATO-US relationships over the Russia-UK relationship. Russia remains a crucial source of energy for Europe and the UK and while the country may rarely agree with any decisions made by Russia on matter international relations, this ambiguous reliability of oil would almost darken the attitude that UK policy-makers are likely to bring on the negotiating table[12].

On the other hand, Russia, appears, to remain quite suspicious that because the UK and the United States have over the years managed to retain a 'special relationship', this automatically makes the UK an unsettled outlier amongst other Western countries. Although the current UK government and the opposition have both openly rejected claims made by Moscow of the existence of a UK-United States partnership that hinges on 'blind loyalty'[13], this has done little to dissuade Russia from its position on the matter.  However, the manner in which the Blair administration was instrumental in organising the Iraq war as a co-partner with the United States must have erased any doubts in the minds of Russians that indeed, London will always seek to front for Washington, and vice-versa.  Judging from a historical point of view, Moscow may have a valid point. The UK-United States cooperation goes as far back as the start of the Cold War, including various close cooperation between the two countries, such as in developing nuclear weapons[14].

In the past decade, Russia has been involved in various cyber attacks, and this could be an indication of the country's willingness to embrace offensive cyber tactics with Western states being on the receiving end. In 2007, Russia was involved in cyber attacks in Estonia. In 2014, Russia initiated another cyber attack on a German steel mill while in 2015 Russia's cyber tactics were evident in the German Bundestang and TV5 Monde, a French television station[15]. In 2016, Russia allegedly interfered with the build-up to the US presidential elections, starting with the leakage of email conversations by Hilary Clinton when she was Secretary of State and hacking of the electronic voting system. While these events are indicative of superior Russian technology, it is also a sign of Western carelessness and vulnerability.

            While the threat from Russia's violent extremism domestically and internationally remains a dominant factor of the public discourse and political bandwidth, the greatest threat to the nations comes in the form of Russia's opportunism. Russia has become in recent years increasingly authoritarian, nationalist and aggressive, in a quest to assert its opposition to Western ideologies.  This Russian/Western confrontation is best exemplified by Russia's intervention in Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and its involvement in Syria, among other actions[16]. This assertiveness is largely informed by Russia's perception of the West. In this case, Russia views the West as a threat on two levels. To begin with, the West poses military and territorial challenge to Russia. For over 300 years, the West has repeatedly invaded Russia notably by France, Sweden, Germany, and Poland[17]. As a result of these invasions, Russia seeks extensive territorial glacis and buffers in a quest to become an aggressive annexationist power in her own right. In addition, Russia is fearful that the open and universal nature with which the West approaches politics acts as an ideological challenge to her national and closed politics.

            Russia assertiveness would have a huge impact on the West. To begin with, The West needs to understand the position of Russia and improve our decision-making and comprehension on matters of Alliance and national interest. For instance, in the event that Georgia joins NATO, this is likely to antagonise her relations with Russia, as opposed to brining about stability.  In an effort to evade loss of credibility and appeasement, the West would be better adviced to identify its 'red lines', avoid crossing these, and pursue coercion or deterrence. The West needs to adopt a more realist approach in matters of international relations. Specifically, there is need to consider deterrence. Although hard power is still crucial, this is not the course that Russia is likely to take. Most likely, Russia will target enemy force and political will.

            The openness with which the West approaches issues differs markedly from the approach adopted by Russia, where maintaining high level of secrecy appears to be the norm. Before the government in any Western state makes any decision, its intentions will have been known. The executive arm of the government begins by launchings trial balloons in the form of well-connected leaks while the media creates a platform from where experts on political matters and international relations hold endless debates[18]. Thereafter, the cabinet or Congress holds several hearings while the opinions of the public are sought via pollsters. This is not how things are done in Russia as the process of making policies remains less clear[19]. Decisions are made by unknown individuals behind closed doors, and not by bureaucratic institutions or constitutional bodies, as is the norm in the West. Authority is handed down via personal connections, and is often strengthened via neighbourhoods, family, and past work or school experiences. Even as all political systems rely to a certain extent of these network ties, the main thing that differentiates Russia from other countries in North America or Europe is the depth and extent of the country's personal patronage system[20]. Leaders at all levels of business, politics, and society in Russia take it as their personal obligation to promote and protect their individual clients within this network. On the other hand, followers feel obliged to repay back favours by being loyal to their patrons[21]. Long-standing emotional ties in society help to reinforce these networks, and they are characterised by immense power that goes beyond self-interest.

            Both Russia and the UK constitute two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but perhaps this is as far as it gets in terms of their similarities. The two countries do not see eye to eye with each other, especially in matters of international relations and political ideologies. This has been quite evident when the UK has been on the same camp with the other Western countries and the United States, such as in the war in Iraq, over Iran's nuclear weapons, and the war in Syria. The UK was also highly critical of Moscow’s annexation of the Crimea region, while its cyber attacks have rubbed western countries the wrong way. These developments, along with the fact that Russia's net imports and exports to the UK have declined in recent decades, indeed make her a problem, and not just an enemy or parent.

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