China in Africa
Introduction
China’s influence in Africa has improved in the last two decades due to the need for resources to quench their increasing need from a rapidly growing economy and an expanding middle class. The country has majored in securing energy resources needed to provide a reliable supply to its industrialization through oil and other essential resources globally and mainly in Africa. It has made considerable investments in Africa through mining and infrastructure in exchange for more advantageous bilateral relations and trade (Alden, 2007). Companies from China also increased investment in the continent and diversified their business activities in the manufacturing, agriculture, and telecommunication sectors. Nonetheless, the country’s influence in Africa has faced criticism from Western civil society over their controversial bilateral relations and also their failure to promote democracy and human rights (Gill et al., 2007, pp. 37-52). Many African governments are content with their activities in the country. This essay aims to shed light on China’s undertakings in sub-Saharan Africa and whether they benefit Africa. China, its energy needs, and Sino-African trade Recently, China has experienced a growth of 10% annually, which requires a large amount of energy to sustain. As a result, it emerged as the world's largest energy consumer and producer. Though the country relies on coal, China developed into a significant consumer of oil since 1993 and surpassed America as the world’s leading importer in the recent past. In 2014, the global world energy predicted that they would be the planet’s leading consumer in 2030. l by 2030. It mainly imports crude oil from Africa, from which it receives approximately 3 million drums of oil in a day. Angola was among the largest suppliers of oil to China in 2016, along with other sub-Saharan countries like Sudan and Congo. Thus, in the quest to secure as many resources as possible, China engages in the most sophisticated commercial diplomacy that is only a dream to most countries, as Michael Levi (2014, p. 123) argues in his book, by all means. Its capital is involved in many trips around resource-rich countries and also can offer low-cost financing and cheap labor for the projects. The country has an unfair edge against other countries from the West, which includes low-cost investment and cheap energy. The economic ties between Beijing and most African countries have continued to thicken as China continues to surpass America as the biggest trading partner, such as in 2010. Approximately 15-18% of all African exports end up in China, and also China exports about 16% to those countries. The imports and exports range from machinery to food to agricultural products. Figure 1 below shows China’s trade activities with African nations.
To become successful, China took a multi-pronged approach in its quest for economic invasion into Africa. According to Deborah Brautigam, a director of the China-Africa Initiative at Johns Hopkins School, China is an essential source of foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa because she offers direct loans to nations with abundant resources like Angola. And also develops economic cooperation and private trade with nations such as Ethiopia and Nigeria (Alden et al., 2008, p. 234).
The growing influence of China in Africa has aroused controversies and media interest, particularly in Western countries. After not being recognized in the Great 8, 'Year of Africa.' The topic raised a lot of debates in the build-up to the China-Africa Summit of 2006 (Brautigam, 2009, p. 45). However, many scholarly and political circles have neglected China's growing ties with African nations. Especially in the concrete acting of most actors from China in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, their economic and political dynamics and also Western views of the phenomena are yet to be fully looked at.
China’s quest to gain economic influence in Africa, the relations changed by an important context from before. The relations today occur under different conditions in which they aim to develop interdependence and become an important economic figure internationally. Economic competition surpassed the ideological differences (French, 2pp. 127-132). , p.127-132)As the country engages in multiple operations for economic betterment in Africa, China is seen as having a long-term plan and is motivated by trade and industry negotiation rather than ambitious ideology from the past. The key motivating factors for China’s economic invasion of Africa include its internal dynamics, the desire to expand its consumer population, and global political factors (Alden et al., 2008, p. 40).
The FOCAC (Forum for China-Africa Cooperation) is the chief state-level association for China's activities in Africa. It is a typically mutual organization between China and 49 nations from Africa recognizing Beijing. They hold meetings to discuss deals and confirmation of the significance of normal relations. The forum is chief, meaning there are more associations; it acts as an enforcer by signing contracts and enforcing the deals. However, it lacks a well-arranged staff.
The primary driver of Chinese invasion is always a search for resources and ensuring a rich supply of raw materials for the increasing energy demands in China. This has reflected China as an important economy in the world; most engagements in Africa include investment in application, and the revolving profile resources need to be associated with its commercial progress (Holslag, 2011, pp. 367-386). After China post-1978, it determined the focus on economic development has experienced annual growth of 9% since then. Nonetheless, from 1990, China needed to seek overseas supplies of energy. The energy issue became an important foreign issue during President Hu Jintao’s period, who was able to expand diplomacy around the world.
Their diplomacy in oil is aimed at increasing their supply of energy (Downs, 2010, pp. 233-250). Another factor is that Chinese companies consider Africa as an arena for their products and with an ability to provide strong commercial potential. Most Chinese businesses and governments have over the years viewed Africa as an arena for economic potential with a large population of consumers. In 2006, Africa received a total of 4% of FDI from China as compared to Latin America’s 26%. However, there has been a noticeable recent increase since they consider Africa as a testing ground for their products and projects.
Emerging Challenges to the Geographic Power
For many African countries, China provides a complicated combination of benefits and difficulties that will eventually pay out differently in different countries and industries. (Mawdsley, 2007, p. 405-421). The extent to which China undermines and changes international regulations on trade will have significant negative consequences. To some observers, some African countries are slow to make strategic agreements with China and much of the interaction is brought about by China. Nonetheless, China had to seek energy supplies from outside the country beginning in 1990. Some have made complaints that the Chinese government is supporting corrupt regimes, low environmental standards, and the flow of low-quality goods in Africa.
However, this might change since China has begun showing interest in the complaints and also that they value economic relationships with many African countries. The trade continues to grow significantly, as does the mix, with Africa now accounting for 28% of China's imported petrol and oil. For China to secure growth, it needs global markets and investment outlets in Africa. They also need to seek political associations with more countries worldwide for their international economic and political integration (Mohan & Lampert, 2010, pp. 92-110). Having said that, the focus of most Western media is the involvement of China in Africa and many African nations, on how although some corrupt regimes make non-beneficial deals with China, others prosper politically and economically by increasing financial openness and regulation. Also, large firms are investing in sub-Saharan Africa with settled Chinese populations conducting their businesses.
Finally, the no-African relations are very important to the West because China’s burgeoning ties with Africa play a significant role in its global rise. While these relations have some benefits to Western investors and consumers, they have also caused a fair share of anxiety among public commentaries. The anxiety is often increased with debates in the media and other policy circles. Some observers, like Johnston, Bates, and Huang, warned of the tendency in America’s foreign policy.
China in Africa: defense and security analysis
Recently, China has increased its role in global security, apart from its dominance in the economic sector, as well as making security her agenda. It has been actively involved in ongoing security maintenance in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa in a well-planned foreign policy arranged in Beijing as it endeavors to engage itself in an internationally harmonious and cohesive campaign. China has evolved from a traditional society to a substantive multilateral actor in the 21st century on the issues of peace and security (Pant, 2008, pp. 33-43). After assuming a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China has been active in promoting peace and security despite several criticisms coming from the UN Security Council involvement in African security is based on three considerations based on a policy that follows her national goal. First, it attempts to improve her worldwide image. As they respond to international requests to help maintain peace, they hope to demonstrate to the rest of the world that China can rely on security concerns (Schoeman, 2010, p.156). Their involvement in world security plays a key role in reassuring African countries about their intentions for peace. Second, China has a desire to protect its international investments; China has, over the past few decades, invested heavily in different economic sectors in Africa. For example, it has made significant investments in the energy and industrial sectors, among others. In the course of this, violent conflicts have threatened their materials, prompting them to proactively put issues concerning security and peace in their foreign policy.
Competing hegemons: Chinese and American geoeconomic agendas in Africa.
Increased search for resources led to the revival of geopolitics in 2000; in part, it was driven by the rapid economic rise of China. Hence, the African economy experienced a huge growth of 5.2% in 2005 due to China and American investment in oil and their demand for materials. Thus Chinese and American investment increased significantly, especially. 345). there September 11th attack (Campbell, 2008, p.345). For example, trade between the US and Africa rose 25% in 2006, and the amount of oil coming from West Africa to the US was greater than that from Saudi Arabia. For the most part, their economic engagements and trade with many countries from Africa moved Africa to the center stage of global security politics and oil. China’s desire to overtake American hegemony and become the global powerhouse was clear. Their expansion accounted for 25% of the global economy in 2007. Thus, the phenomenal economic growth led to growth in demand for resources (Camordy & Owusu, 2007, p.130). While the US can rely on itself as an aspirant hegemony, China was forced to use other strategies, like forming economic relations with many countries from Africa that had proved to provide a rich supply of energy resources to them.
The recipients of China's 'no strings' aid strategy
In recent years, China has overseen a significant shift in aid policy from net contributor to net receiver and subsequently emergent donor. From 2010, their total financial aid into Africa approximated $73 billion; this was very high relative to the authorized overseas aid of $10 billion (Strange et al., 2014, pp. 323-346). Despite the growing significance of their source, the FDI as a supplier of overseas support to Africa, the aid policy is still merely understood, and its influence on expansion in sub-Sahara Africa is controversial. Rather than involving themselves in the model of official development assistance (ODA). They have promoted investment integration via bilateral agreements with African nations.
Another key factor is their selfish motivation to put their own administrative and commercial interests ahead of recipients’ priorities. Thus, they are termed as rogue aid. Nonetheless, supporting this assertion and criticizing their development strategy carries danger. While China's aid and investment have gradually increased, their link in terms of sectoral distribution and geographical coverage is not as predicted. They have not built a strong and consistent aid plan. Instead, China’s profit-driven businesses launch their projects to implement their agendas.
As China’s influence grows in sub-Saharan Africa, its investors are more exposed to structural vulnerability; the success of their plans mostly is reliant on the recipient country’s recipient’s ability to maintain a stable environment. While they continue insisting on the no-strings aid policy, they first have to pay close devotion to domestic affairs. (Strange et al., 2014, pp. 323-346). There are competing factors and interests in their aid policy. Notably, Chinese corporations can exploit aid schemes to push their objectives, leading to unforeseen consequences for foreign policy aims.
China claims that its economic operations help developing nations promote long-term economic growth, although these development goals are frequently influenced by commercial, diplomatic, and strategic reasons. There are three main perspectives on their development activities in Africa (Rotberg, 2008). The first one is to maintain the important resources needed in Beijing; as an emerging superpower, the country’s demand for energy resources continues to increase; hence it has to leverage its economic power to attain political and economic objectives. However, their ability to grow depends on their success in controlling the behavior of economic actors. For example, consider the construction of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).
The reason why China’s involvement became increasingly politicized
After the non-Soviet split in the late 1950s, China gradually slipped into self-imposed isolation and decided to change its focus to Africa. Thus the whole education system became politicized as enrolments were now based on class background, and institutional changes with other countries stopped. The country became a learning destination for African nations. Nonetheless, the number of African students was minimal; only 190 African students managed to study in China.
Efforts to democratize Africa being buried by China’s activities
China is an ancient friend to most African countries and has witnessed substantial transformation over the last several decades regarding its internal revolution. From Mao Zedong's leadership in 1949 until the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, their ideological foreign policy, internal developments, and other factors are important in determining their relationship with Africa. Though their relationship faced great impact from the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet conflict began in the late 1960s until the mid-80s and was almost as important (Tylor, 2006, pp. 937-959). China’s great revolution began with the proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 and continued up until 1976 and had a significant impact on the relationship between China and Africa.
The Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 coincided with the revelation of the Cold War and marked a watershed in how Africa viewed China. During those years, only a few African countries had gained independence, and also, China’s weak economic ability limited their chances of interacting with Africa. In 1950, trade between China and Africa was a paltry $12 million but grew to $100 in 1960. They largely supported African liberation movements in countries such as Algeria, despite their limited resources (Pant, 2008, pp. 33-43). In some instances, China also provided military support; for example, they supported the left-wing movement in Cameroon and Congo that opposed the independent government. The Great Leap and Cultural Revolutions would have restrained China from adequately investing in Africa. In return, many African countries played a significant role in helping Beijing replace Taipei as the president. China regularly brings up this occurrence in its contacts with Africa. China-Africa trade increased to $1 billion in 1980 and also moved to $10 billion in 2000 while China experienced a GDP growth of 9% every year from the 1980s. With these developments, a dramatic economic increase was witnessed during the interactions while the end of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflicts opened more possibilities for them. It also ended the rationale for supporting movements in their liberation quests. After the events that took place at Tiananmen Square, there was a positive future for relations between China and Africa (Lee et al., 2007, pp. 35-67). Nonetheless, criticism from the West on the events that took place in Tiananmen Square continued to increase, but some African countries kept silent, and few even publicly supported Beijing’s positions. China avoids criticizing African governments and their human rights policies, and in turn, African governments also do not criticize their internal political issues.
The majority of Chinese-African connections have been commercial, with no political difficulties. For the most part, companies from China have developed a reliable reputation, though there are a few complaints about the quality of some goods. A problem not yet solved by the Chinese government is the export of adult-rated and counterfeit products to Africa. African nations lack organizations dedicated only to preventing these items from accessing African markets, and China has taken no remedial actions to prohibit private enterprises from exporting them (Large, 2008, p.426). There are also serious complaints from some African companies that face stiff competition from established businesses from China. In certain circumstances, Chinese businesses gain tremendously from supply sources linked to the family in China. Another major complaint is when Chinese firms import their people to come and work on their projects instead of hiring local labor. Africans understand the need to use high-skilled workers, but also some works do not need great skills of professionalism to be completed.
Conclusion
As China continues to seek increasing trade, diplomatic missions, and investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the outcomes, as we have discussed above, will be politically, environmentally, and economically huge. Their relations continue to increase with the imports and exports increasing. Their main aim is to maintain their external supply of energy for their expanding economy and not only to help develop African countries' continued economic stability. We have seen cases of China collaborating with corrupt leaders to push their agenda in the countries while others borrow huge loans from China, which they will have to pay later. Thus, their aggressiveness in their investment into Africa is aimed at benefiting China, in the long run, leaving most African countries with huge debts to pay in the future.
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